From the Library of Congress, excerpted from here:

  SEC. 575. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTION OF CAPTAIN CHARLES BUTLER McVAY, COMMANDER OF THE U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS, AND ON THE COURAGEOUS SERVICE OF ITS CREW.

    (a) FINDINGS.--Congress makes the following findings:

    (1) Shortly after midnight on the morning of July 30, 1945, the United States Navy heavy cruiser U.S.S. Indianapolis (CA-35) was torpedoed and sunk by the Japanese submarine I-58 in what became the worst sea disaster in the history of the United States Navy.

    (2) Although approximately 900 of the ship's crew of 1,196 survived the actual sinking, only 316 of those courageous sailors survived when rescued after four and a half days adrift in the open sea.

    (3) Nearly 600 of the approximately 900 men who survived the sinking perished from battle wounds, drowning, predatory shark attacks, exposure to the elements, and lack of food and potable water.

    (4) Rescue came for the remaining 316 sailors when they were spotted by chance by Navy Lieutenant Wilbur C. Gwinn while flying a routine naval air patrol mission.

    (5) After the end of World War II, the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, Captain Charles Butler McVay, who was rescued with the other survivors, was court-martialed for ``suffering a vessel to be hazarded through negligence'' by failing to zigzag (a naval tactic employed to help evade submarine attacks), and was convicted even though--

    (A) the choice to zigzag was left to Captain McVay's discretion in his orders; and

    (B) Motchisura Hashimoto, the commander of the Japanese submarine that sank the U.S.S. Indianapolis, and Glynn R. Donaho, a United States Navy submarine commander highly decorated for his service during World War II, both testified at Captain McVay's court-martial trial that the Japanese submarine could have sunk the U.S.S. Indianapolis whether or not it had been zigzagging, an assertion that the Japanese submarine commander has since reaffirmed in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

    (6) Although not argued by Captain McVay's defense counsel in the court-martial trial, poor visibility on the night of the sinking (as attested in surviving crew members' handwritten accounts recently discovered at the National Archives) justified Captain McVay's choice not to zigzag as that choice was consistent with the applicable Navy directives in force in 1945, which stated that, ``During thick weather and at night, except on very clear nights or during bright moonlight, vessels normally cease zig-zagging.''.

    (7) Naval officials failed to provide Captain McVay with available support that was critical to the safety of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and its crew on what became its final mission by--

    (A) disapproving a request made by Captain McVay for a destroyer escort for the U.S.S. Indianapolis across the Philippine Sea as being ``not necessary'';

    (B) not informing Captain McVay that naval intelligence sources, through signal intelligence (the Japanese code having been broken earlier in World War II), had become aware that the Japanese submarine I-58 was operating in the area of the U.S.S. Indianapolis' course (as disclosed in evidence presented in a hearing of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate); and

    (C) not informing Captain McVay of the sinking of the destroyer escort U.S.S. Underhill by a Japanese submarine within range of the course of the U.S.S. Indianapolis four days before the U.S.S. Indianapolis departed Guam on its fatal voyage.

    (8) Captain McVay's court-martial initially was opposed by his immediate command superiors, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz (CINCPAC) and Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance of the 5th fleet, for which the U.S.S. Indianapolis served as flagship, but, despite their recommendations, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal ordered the court-martial, largely on the basis of the recommendation of Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations.

    (9) There is no explanation on the public record for Secretary Forestal's overruling of the recommendations made by Admirals Nimitz and Spruance.

    (10) Captain McVay was the only commander of a United States Navy vessel lost in combat to enemy action during World War II who was subjected to a court-martial trial for such a loss, even though several hundred United States Navy ships were lost in combat to enemy action during World War II.

    (11) The survivors of the U.S.S. Indianapolis overwhelmingly conclude that McVay was not at fault and have dedicated their lives to vindicating their Captain, Charles McVay, but time is running out for the 130 remaining members of the crew in their united and steadfast quest to clear their Captain's name.

    (12) Although Captain McVay was promoted to Rear Admiral upon retirement from the Navy, he never recovered from the stigma of his post-

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war court-martial and in 1968, tragically, took his own life.

    (13) Captain McVay was a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, was an exemplary career naval officer with an outstanding record (including participation in the amphibious invasions of North Africa, the assault on Iwo Jima, and the assault on Okinawa where he survived a fierce kamikaze attack), was a recipient of the Silver Star earned for courage under fire during the Solomon Islands campaign, and, with his crew, had so thoroughly demonstrated proficiency in naval warfare that the Navy entrusted Captain McVay and the crew with transporting, on their fatal cruise, the components necessary for assembling the atomic bombs that were exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the war with Japan.

    (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--(1) It is the sense of Congress, on the basis of the facts presented in a public hearing conducted by the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on September 14, 1999, including evidence not available at the time of Captain Charles Butler McVay's court-martial, and on the basis of extensive interviews and questioning of witnesses and knowledgeable officials and a review of the record of the court-martial for and in that hearing, that--

    (A) recognizing that the Secretary of the Navy remitted the sentence of the court-martial and that Admiral Nimitz, as Chief of Naval Operations, restored Captain McVay to active duty, the American people should now recognize Captain McVay's lack of culpability for the tragic loss of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and the lives of the men who died as a result of her sinking; and

    (B) knowing that vital information was not available to the court-martial board and that, as a result, Captain McVay was convicted, Captain McVay's military record should now reflect that he is exonerated for the loss of the ship and its crew.

    (2) It is, further, the sense of Congress that Congress strongly encourages the Secretary of the Navy to award a Navy Unit Commendation to the U.S.S. Indianapolis and its final crew.